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Abstract	
Because of its high incidence and potential threat to social cohesion, youth unemployment 
is a global concern. This study uses a randomized controlled trial to analyze the effectiveness 
of a demand-driven vocational training program for disadvantaged youth in Mongolia. 
Mongolia, a transitional country whose economic structure shifted from a communist, 
centrally planned economy to a free-market economy over a relatively short period, offers a 
new setting in which to test the effectiveness of standard active labor market policies. This 
study reports positive and statistically significant short-term effects of vocational training on 
monthly earnings, skills matching, and self-employment. Substantial heterogeneity emerges 
as relatively older, richer, and better-educated individuals drive these positive effects. A 
second intervention that randomly assigns participants to receive repetitive weekly 
newsletters with information on market returns to vocational training shows positive impacts 
on the length of exposure to and successful completion of the program. These positive 
effects, however, are only observed at the intensive margin and do not lead to higher 
employment or earnings outcomes. 	
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I. Introduction 
Youth unemployment is an ubiquitous problem in most developed and developing 
countries. Over seventy-three million youth aged 15-24 are unemployed worldwide, and 
around 20 percent of the world’s youth are neither employed nor enrolled in an education 
or training program (ILO, 2017). The labor-market conditions of disadvantaged youth are 
even more dramatic because they disproportionately lack skills and access to decent jobs 
that could lift them out of poverty (ILO, 2015). In Mongolia, the setting of our study, youth 
unemployment reached 23 percent in 2017, while the share of young individuals who were 
neither employed nor enrolled in an education or training program topped 25 percent 
(Shatz et al., 2015). Such a situation entails a massive waste of economic resources and is a 
threat to social cohesion. 
In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of an Active Labor Market Program (ALMP) 
that targets poor and unemployed youth in Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia. The aim 
of the program is to improve the overall employability of young participants through a 
combination of in-class vocational skills training and on-the-job training. Although 
vocational skills training is the most widely used ALMP for disadvantaged youth worldwide 
(Betcherman et al., 2007), there is no evidence regarding its effectiveness in central Asia. 
The most recent meta-analyses (Card et al., 2018 and Kluve et al., 2019) reveal this 
important gap in the literature.  
The large body of evidence presented and discussed in recent systematic reviews of 
ALMPs (e.g., Kluve et al., 2019), makes clear that contextual reality matters in measuring the 
magnitude and statistical relevance of labor-market outcomes. Mongolia is a new setting for 
an assessment of ALMPs because it is a “transitional country”—that is, one whose labor 
market was rapidly transformed from a centrally planned to a free-market economy. In fact, 
Mongolia’s economy shifted from a centralized, communist system, in which youth 
unemployment was officially very low or nonexistent, to a free-market economy with one of 
the highest rates of youth unemployment in the world. Assessing whether vocational-skills 
training would foster employment and wage growth for young, vulnerable, and 
unemployed individuals in such an environment is relevant to policy. 
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The Mongolian vocational skills-training program is a so-called “demand-driven” 
ALMP, which combines in-class training in selected vocational skills with on-the-job training 
in the form of paid internships (see, e.g., Galdo, Jaramillo and Montalva, 2008 and Ibarrarán 
and Rosas, 2009). In the mid-nineties, following structural economic reforms similar to those 
seen in Mongolia, demand-driven programs became widely used in several Latin American 
countries, and assessments of their effectiveness showed positive effects on employment 
and earnings, particularly for disadvantaged women (Betcherman et al., 2007). Under this 
approach, private institutions offer training courses in occupations in which labor demand 
exists. Whether such a market-based training scheme would work in a transitional economy 
such as Mongolia’s remains an important question. 
From a methodological standpoint, we implemented a market-based program 
design following a standard randomized-control-trial (RCT) approach, which allowed us to 
identify, under weak conditions, causal treatment effects on employment and earnings. In 
fact, this is the first ALMP in central Asia to employ an experimental counterfactual design. 
Although RCTs have long been used in the U.S. in programs such as the National 
Supported Work Demonstration and the Job Training Partnership Act, experimental 
evidence from developing countries remains limited, although studies in the past decade 
have increased, particularly in Latin America and Africa.1 
One important source of variation in the magnitude of treatment effects for training 
programs is lack of compliance with the treatment design (Heckman et al., 2000). 
Disadvantaged individuals are commonly unable to complete training programs because of 
personal or institutional barriers or because they lack information/knowledge regarding the 
returns to training. No matter the specific source of this empirical regularity, the 
effectiveness of training programs depends upon the length of exposure to the intervention 
as shown in Galdo et al. (2012) and Choe, Flores-Lagunes, and Lee (2015).  This finding 
points toward policy choices that would increase training exposure for potential dropouts. 
Because lack of knowledge about market returns to training in a setting in transition 
from Communism to a market-based economy could lead participants to make uninformed 
																																								 																				
1 See Attanasio, Kegler, and Meghir (2011), Card et al. (2011), and Ibarrarán et al. (2015) for Latin America; and 
Blattman et al. (2014) and Cho et al. (2013) for Africa. 
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choices, we used a second randomization design within the group of participants to 
distribute, on a random basis, personalized weekly newsletters with information about the 
returns to vocational training in Mongolia. While the importance of providing information 
about market returns has been shown to be effective in other developing settings such as 
school classrooms (Jensen, 2010), to the best of our knowledge it has not been tested as a 
policy design in the context of an ALMP in a developing or transitional country. 
 Our results show positive and statistically significant short-term wage gains 
for the average participant. These wage gains hold one year after the training. We also 
observe positive and statistically significant effects in self-employment and skills matching 
along with small but not significant effects for salary work. Important heterogeneities in the 
results emerge as relatively older, more educated and less poor individuals benefit more 
from this intervention. Unlike recent training interventions in developed (Card, Kluve and 
Weber, 2010 and Card et al., 2018) and developing settings (Attanasio, Kugler and Meghir, 
2011; Alzúa, Cruces and Lopez, 2016, Díaz and Rosas, 2016), we find no differential 
treatment effects by gender. Finally, provision of weekly newsletters to trainees with 
information on market returns for vocational training in Mongolia led to significant gains in 
the length of exposure to the program and lower dropout rates. These positive results do 
not, however, translate into higher employment or earnings. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the Mongolian labor 
market, while section 3 provides details about the training design institutions. Section 4 
develops the evaluation experimental design as section 5 discusses the data and baseline 
covariate distribution for treatment groups. Section 6 presents the results while section 7 
provides some concluding remarks.   
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II. Institutional Setting 
Mongolia is a small, transitional country with a population of slightly above three 
million. It is a landlocked area located between Russia and China (Figure 1). Ethnic Mongols 
account for about 95 percent of the population, and the most common language, spoken 
by most of the population, is Mongolian. Mongolia is one of the least densely populated 
countries in the world, with almost half its population living in the city of Ulaanbaatar, the 
country’s capital. Mongolia’s population is relatively young: 42 percent of its people were 
younger than 24 in 2018. Following the dismantling of the USSR in the early 1990s, 
Mongolia’s economy changed dramatically from a centrally planned system to a market-
based one, and Soviet assistance, which had accounted for almost one third of Mongolia’s 
GDP, disappeared almost overnight. 
Today, Mongolia has a per capita GDP of $13,000 USD (PPP), which makes its 
economy comparable to that of South Africa or Sri Lanka. Because Mongolia is resource-
rich, with large deposits of copper, gold, coal, and uranium, its mining sector accounts for 
almost one fifth of GDP and 40 percent of exports. This sector has transformed Mongolia in 
a few decades from a traditional agricultural- and herding-based economy to a resource-
based economy. Agriculture nonetheless remains the largest employer in the country and 
absorbs 30 percent of the labor force 
Before the transition, the Mongolian labor market was characterized by high labor-
force participation that reached more than 75 percent in the early 1990s. According to 
official statistics, unemployment was nonexistent because of the “everyone should work” 
policy, and the youth-unemployment rate was reported as close to zero. Only after 1992 did 
Mongolia begin measuring and reporting unemployment rates. Economic reforms 
implemented in the 1990s and afterward, including privatization and price liberalization, led 
to structural changes in Mongolia’s economy: labor-force participation began to fall while 
unemployment rates increased dramatically. Indeed, youth unemployment reached 23 
percent in 2017, almost twice the global rate (13 percent). Moreover, the share of inactive 
youth aged 15-29 who are not in education, employment, or training (NEET) has remained 
consistently above 20 percent since the early 2000s (Shatz et al., 2015). The NEET rate is 
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disproportionately higher for young women relative to men and for urban households 
relative to rural ones. 				
III. The Mongolian Vocational Training Program 
The Mongolian Vocational Training Program (VTP) was introduced in 2003 in an 
effort to counteract high levels of youth unemployment. The primary goal of the Mongolian 
VTP was to help unemployed people get jobs through a combination of vocational skills 
training and internships in private firms, and it remains the oldest and most extensive labor-
market policy in effect in the country. The Mongolian VTP follows key aspects of standard 
demand-driven training approaches skills training is aligned to the real needs of local 
employers. 
The rationale for demand-driven programs is twofold. Firstly, they aim to de-
centralize the traditional supply of vocational training by public institutions in favor of a 
market of private institutions that can offer relevant, up-to-date training. Established private 
firms therefore usually bid to offer training. Secondly, they aim to train beneficiaries in 
vocations that the market demands by combining traditional classroom education with on-
the-job training in the form of internships, and the private suppliers of training courses 
connect participants with internships.  
The Employment Promotion Service Center (EPSC) of the Mongolian Ministry of 
Labor is the public entity responsible for the overall design and implementation of the 
training program, including the selection of training institutions and participants. The VTP is 
financed by the State Employment Promotion Fund which targets youth aged 15-30 who 
are poor, unemployed, or vulnerable to unemployment. According to administrative data 
from the Ministry of Labor, the total number of participants by 2011 was 8,000 and the total 
program expenditure was approximately 3.5 billion MNT, equivalent to $2.1 million USD. 
The EPSC selects training institutions through a competitive bidding process. The selection 
criteria for training institutions include evidence of ability to provide adequate training, legal 
registration, curriculum quality, teaching quality, adequacy of training sites, and, 
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importantly, the ability to place trainees in internship positions with registered private 
employers. 
Although the Mongolian VTP started in 2003, its effectiveness has never been 
assessed. This paper focus on the 2013 call that purposely used a randomized controlled 
trial to identify and measure its impact. In that year, the Metropolitan Employment 
Department (MED) selected 47 training institutions in Ulaanbaatar that offered 141 courses 
in some eighty different vocational skills, including construction, hairdressing, cooking, and 
heavy-machinery operation. The length of training varied from twenty to forty-five days, 
depending upon vocation, with a minimum duration of 144 hours per course. According to 
the program’s regulations, traditional classroom teaching did not exceed 30 percent of total 
hours, and practical, on-the-job training and internships accounted for the rest. Compared 
to other vocational training programs in developing countries (see, e.g., McKenzie, 2017), 
the Mongolian VTP was shorter and, thus, less expensive. The tuition fee was set between 
140,000 MNT and 220,000 MNT per participant in 2013 (approximately USD $90-$140). 
The program offered no additional benefits such as transportation, meals, or insurance. Due 
to budgetary constraints, the official number of training slots was originally set to 1,400 in 
2013. 
Prospective trainees aged 15-30 were assessed at their local district office. After 
completing a short baseline questionnaire, each applicant was screened for eligibility by an 
administrative officer. All suitable applicants were sent to a district labor office in which 
each applicant, alongside a labor officer, chose chooses her preferred vocational-skills 
course in a given institution on a first-come-first-served basis. To secure participation, 
eligible individuals signed an agreement with the corresponding labor office. Up until the 
Spring of 2013, participants were required to sign a “trilateral” contract that involved an 
EPSC district officer, a MED officer, and the beneficiary. Thus, it was solely the responsibility 
of training institutions to obtain internships for trainees. Subsequently, the EPSC changed to 
a “quadrilateral” agreement that added prospective employers as a fourth signatory. In 
practice, this meant that both trainees and training centers were, by agreement, equally in 
charge of securing internships. As Section 5 shows, this institutional change created an 
important slowdown in registration and enrollment, which in turn affected no-shows. 
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IV. Evaluation Design 
The RCT design was implemented during registration by allocating eligible trainees 
randomly to treatment and control groups. Registration took place between August 26th 
and November 22th, 2013.  Each day during that period, the flow of eligible applicants was 
randomly assigned to either the treatment or control groups based on a 2:1 rule. As a 
result, the treatment group was made up of 774 trainees (65.2 percent), and 414 (34.8  
percent) were assigned to the control group for a total of 1,188 participants.2 
Individuals in the treatment group were distributed across 141 courses at 47 seven 
training centers. Class size varied highly across training courses and ranged from three to 30 
participants. The average number of MED-funded students was 9.6 per class. Actual class 
sizes may have been slightly larger, however, because training institutions were entitled to 
recruit privately funded students if maximum class size was not reached. Though this 
happened occasionally, the significance was marginal and most courses maintained small 
class sizes. 
We incorporated a second, independent random allocation scheme as part of the 
evaluation design to evaluate whether providing information to trainees about market 
returns to training affected participation and length of exposure to the program. 
Administrative data showed that dropout rates were particularly high for the Mongolian 
VTP. Because there is no evidence regarding the labor-market effects of this ALMP, it could 
be argued that the average participant might not be fully aware of the labor-market 
benefits of completing this training initiative. This information constraint is even more 
important in the context of Mongolia’s very rapid transition from a state-controlled to a 
market-based economy. Inspired by Jensen (2010), we added an information feature to our 
evaluation framework that consisted of randomly assigning participants to receive weekly 
newsletters that contained information on market returns to vocational training.  
In the context of formal schooling in the Dominican Republic, Jensen (2010) showed 
that students tended to underestimate the returns to formal schooling. When they were 
																																								 																				2 We originally set the sample size to 2100 individuals corresponding to 1400 in the treatment group and 700 in 
the control group to be able to detect a three percentage-point increase in employment with a power of 80 
percent and a dropout rate of 30 percent. Unfortunately, and due to budget’s revisions, the Mongolian 
government slashed the number of potential beneficiaries for the 2013 call.  
	 8 
correctly informed, however, both enrollment in the subsequent year and the average 
length of formal schooling increased. In the context of vocational training programs, Galdo 
et al. (2012) and Choe, Flores-Lagunes, and Lee (2015) showed for Peru and South Korea, 
respectively, that failure of participants to complete training programs negatively affects the 
returns to training. 
We thus randomly assigned weekly newsletters to training-program participants. 
This allocation of newsletters was implemented at the class level, rather than at an 
individual level, to prevent spillover effects. The treatment itself consisted of the delivery of 
weekly newsletters, with comparative information about labor market outcomes of skilled 
and unskilled workers in Mongolia, to each student in selected classes. The newsletters 
clearly stated market wages for occupations in sectors that were similar to those of the 
trainees and compared wages for jobs filled by unskilled workers. Appendix Table 1A shows 
a typical newsletter submitted to students. We randomly assigned 101 classes to the 
treatment newsletter group and 40 classes to the control group. 				
V. Data, Balancing Tests, and Take-Up Assessment 
Our empirical framework is based on individual-level survey data, including a 
baseline collected in the fall of 2013 and two follow-up surveys administered six and twelve 
months after training. Figure 2 illustrates the timeline of the intervention and data 
collection. The evaluation data includes sociodemographic variables, participation in formal 
schooling and training, labor-market outcomes, and detailed information on participation in 
the Mongolian VTP. With respect to the original sample, data attrition reached 5.4 percent 
at baseline, 9.6 percent at the first follow-up survey, and 15 percent at the second follow-up 
survey as shown in Appendix Table 2A. Although attrition seems to be non-random, it is 
relatively low and affect both treatment and control groups evenly.3 This survey data is 
																																								 																				3 Appendix Table 3A shows the mean differences test for attrition status for the first and second follow-up 
surveys. Results show that attrition is correlated with gender, household size, the presence of children, dwelling 
type, income per capita below poverty line, marital status, and work experience. We use these variables as 
control covariates in the computation of treatment effects.  
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complemented by administrative data available from 46 out of 47 institutions that offered 
training programs and included variables such as the number of instructors per classroom, 
average class size, expenditure per student, and instructor salaries. These variables are used 
to explore the relationship between the quality of the training centers and the magnitude of 
treatment effects.  
Table 1 shows the mean covariate balancing test for two experimental designs, one 
for the allocation of training slots (left panel) and one for the allocation of weekly 
newsletters to individuals who received treatment (right panel). Baseline data show that the 
typical applicant is twenty-three years old, female (65 percent), and poor (83 percent lived 
in Gers). Almost half of the participants are married (46 percent), have children (42 percent), 
and live with their parents (47 percent). On average, they show high levels of formal 
schooling (80 percent have at least completed high school) and prior labor experience (60 
percent). The p-values for the coefficients of OLS models that regress treatment status on 
baseline covariates (left panel) are above 0.10 in all cases, indicating that individuals in the 
treatment and control groups came from the same population.  
For the newsletter-treatment group, on the other hand, the right panel in Table 1 
shows that the p-values for most variables do not reject the equality of means between 
experimentally determined treatment groups. We reject this equality with regard to a few 
variables, however—mainly those related to chosen vocations. This is expected because 
random allocation of VTP participants to the newsletter-treatment group occurred at the 
course rather than at the individual level. 
Because administrative data revealed lack of full compliance with the treatment, it 
was important to assess the determinants of take-up of the VTP in order to understand 
potential implications for the assessment of treatment effects. Out of the 766 applicants 
randomly assigned to receive vocational-skills training, 327 (42 percent) did not show up for 
training. Appendix Table 4A gives detailed information on enrollment numbers. Self-
reported survey information indicated that, among those who did not receive the treatment, 
35 percent cited family and personal commitments (e.g., household chores or pregnancy), 
30 percent had started a new job right after enrollment, and 31 percent said they were not 
able to comply with the requirements (i.e., trilateral vs. quadrilateral) of the VTP contract. 
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From a policy standpoint, then, empirical assessment of the determinants of take-up 
becomes essential in order to gain insight both into the operation of the program (e.g., 
targeting, eligibility rules, institutional requirements) and into the identification and 
estimation of the parameters of interest. 
Table 2 shows the results from linear probability models in which the dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 for those treatment-group individuals who received the 
treatment and 0 for those who did not. We used a rich set of independent baseline 
covariates, including standard sociodemographic and labor-market variables, prior labor-
market outcomes, VTP institutional variables, and self-reported expectations regarding 
training and performance in the labor market. Our results indicate that a handful of 
sociodemographic variables were statistically correlated with take-up decisions. On 
average, gender, household wealth, age, and formal schooling were important to take-up 
rates because women and individuals who were wealthier, older, and better-educated were 
more likely to participate in the program relative to men, poorer, younger, and less well-
educated individuals. Importantly, we found no meaningful statistical relationship between 
take-up and labor-market variables at baseline. This pattern ran counter to observations in 
other labor market programs in which variables related to labor markets emerged as the 
main determinants of take-up. 
Moreover, institutional variables related to the operation of the Mongolian VTP 
emerge as important take-up predictors. Individuals who are required to present 
quadrilateral contracts, for example, were fifty-four percentage points less likely to take-up 
the treatment relative to individuals asked to present trilateral contracts. This institutional 
requirement constituted a critical barrier for take-up. Likewise, the likelihood of attending 
the training is statistically related to the vocational-skills courses chosen. Individuals who 
initially selected courses related to hairdressing and craftsmanship are less likely to attend 
training (-20 percentage points), while individuals who selected mechanical- and machinery-
related courses are more likely to participate (+18 percentage points). 
Table 2 also shows that take-up decisions were associated with self-reported 
expectations regarding training, labor-markets, and the role of government in facilitating 
jobs for youth. Individuals who felt optimistic about getting a job or those who believed 
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that the government should play a major role in helping youth find jobs took up the 
treatment disproportionately. On the other hand, individuals who self-report a high 
probability of getting a job in the next months or individuals who believe that getting a job 
is primarily a personal responsibility are less likely to take-up the treatment. 
Overall, as shown by the p-values of joint significance at the bottom of Table 2, 
sociodemographic and institutional variables (contractual agreements) are the most 
important predictors of take-up rates, while prior labor market outcomes are not statistically 
associated to take-up decisions. 				
VI. Empirical Framework and Findings  
As a result of the lack of compliance with the random allocation to treatment, we 
follow the standard approach described in the literature and considered the estimation of 
two parameters of interest: intent-to-treat (ITT) and effective treatment-on-the-treated 
(TOT). The estimate of the intent-to-treat parameter is based on a standard, multivariate 
linear regression function of the form: 		 	 	 	(1)	
where is the outcome of interest for individual ,  is  the treatment indicator (1 for those 
offered treatment and 0 otherwise).  are individual- and household-level baseline control 
variables, and  is the error term4. Because we have as many experimental groups as the 
number of days the random allocation lasted, Equation 1 also includes fixed-effects by day 
of random assignment, τi. 
The effective treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) parameter, on the other hand, is 
estimated by 2SLS estimator following an instrumental variable approach in which actual 
participation in the training program (T) is instrumented by treatment status (Z): 
																																								 																				4 Control variables included gender, age, schooling, poverty index, district of residence, type of dwelling, 
marital status, subjective expectations related to likelihood of getting a job, ambition to succeed in the labor 
market, self-reliance in job-seeking, and government’s responsibility to provide a job.  
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		 	 	 (2)	
Appendix Table 5A shows the first-stage estimation results. The coefficient 
associated with the instrumental variable Z is statistically significant at the 1% level, and the 
resulting F-statistic is 24, which indicates the relevance and strength of the instrument. 
Table 3 presents the main results for four outcomes of interest (employment, 
monthly earnings, skills matching, and self-employment) at six and twelve months following 
training. Both robust standard errors (in parenthesis) and clustered standard errors by date 
of random assignment (in brackets) are reported. The upper panel shows short-term (six-
month) treatment effects, while the lower panel shows the medium-term (twelve-month) 
mean effects. 
Short-term effects are presented in Table 3. The point estimates make clear that the 
average gain of offering the training is positive and statistically significant for monthly 
earnings, skills matching, and self-employment. The magnitude of the effects for monthly 
earnings is relatively large (as high as 23%) from a mean of the control group of 
approximately $100 USD. In addition, we found statistically significant effects equivalent to 
six percentage points for the skills-matching outcome, indicating that the vocational skills of 
participants are better aligned to occupations with respect to those of individuals in the 
control group. 
We additionally observe statistically significant effects on self-employment equal to 
3.5 percentage points. Self-employment double among VTP participants relative to non-
participants, although its incidence remained very low in comparison to what is commonly 
observed in other developing countries. Finally, we observe positive (5.5 percentage points) 
but imprecisely measured ITT effects for the employment variable. Regarding TOT 
estimates in the second row, the magnitude of the effect increases as expected: monthly 
earnings for those who received the treatment increases in more than 50 percent relative to 
the mean of the control group, while the average gain for skills matching and self-
employment reaches 14 and 8 percentage points. The employment variable shows a sizable 
mean impact of 12 percentage points, although it is imprecisely measured. 
The lower panel in Table 3 shows mean effects twelve months after completion of 
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training. For monthly earnings and self-employment, the point estimates for both ITT and 
TOT parameters quite in line with short-term findings, and positive and statistically 
significant effects emerge. Likewise, we observe positive gains for the employment 
outcome but lack statistical precision. On the other hand, the effects on skills matching 
dissipates and become statistically not significant one year later. This result indicates that, in 
the medium-term, the training initiative fell short of achieving one of its promises: matching 
occupations and vocational skills for youth. 			
 Heterogeneous Effects 
To account for the heterogeneity of effects across subgroups of participants, we 
follow the same estimation framework for ITT and TOT parameters given in Equations 1 and 
2 after interacting the treatment status variable with the covariates of interest: gender (men 
vs. women), age (15-21 vs. 22-30), poverty status (poorest vs. less poor), and educational 
attainment (less than high school vs. high school or tertiary education). These policy 
variables, commonly used in the assessment of vocational training programs worldwide, are 
related to the efficiency of the targeting approach. As before, we use the same four 
outcomes of interest at six (Table 4A) and twelve months (Table 4B) after the intervention. 
The results highlight the large heterogeneity of vocational-training effects across 
demographic groups. Table 4A reports that individuals aged 21, normally the demographic 
group at the highest risk of unemployment, benefit least from the program six months after 
treatment. According to TOT point estimates at six months after training, the likelihood of 
employment, self-employment, and skills matching is, respectively, 27, 17, and 17 
percentage points lower for the youngest group relative to the 22-30-year-old cohort. 
Twelve months after the intervention, however, these differences are no longer statistically 
significant. This suggests a rapid deterioration of VTP effects over time for all age groups 
rather than an improvement in labor market outcomes for the youngest vs. the older 
cohorts. Consistent (negative) differential effects for monthly earnings also emerged for the 
youngest group six months after the intervention; at twelve months, the point estimates 
become significant only at the 10% level. Because lack of compliance with the requirements 
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of demand-driven design (e.g., firms’ internships contracts) was disproportionately higher 
among participants younger than 22, these results seem to suggest that a different 
approach to targeting and efficiency may be needed for this cohort. Interestingly, the 
second panel of Tables 4A and 4B show that men and women benefit equally across all 
outcomes of interest. This important result is contrary to what has been observed in similar 
demand-driven approaches in other countries, particularly in Latin America, as shown by 
Attanasio, Kugler and Meghir (2011) for Colombia; Card et al. (2011) and Ibarrarán et al. 
(2015) for the Dominican Republic; Alzúa, Cruces & Lopez, 2016 for Argentina; and Díaz 
and Rosas (2016) for Perú. All these studies showed that young women benefited more 
from this type of vocational training initiatives than did young men. 
While the Mongolian VTP was originally designed to target youth from poor 
households, Tables 4A and 4B also show that people in the bottom quartile of the 
household asset index benefit less from the program. In comparing those at the bottom of 
the poverty index to those at the middle and upper end of the distribution, the TOT 
parameters show statistically significant differential coefficients for employment (-37 
percentage points), skills matching (-23 percentage points), and self-employment (-17 
percentage points). These sizable differences in treatment effects hold 12 months later, 
although the employment and skills-matching outcomes lack statistical significance. 
Monthly earnings for the poorest among the poor, on the other hand, show negative 
differential effects at six and twelve months after the intervention, although these effects are 
measured with statistical precision only at the twelve-month period. 
Finally, sizable heterogeneous effects emerge on the basis of participants’ formal 
level of schooling. Individuals with less than a high-school education and those who had 
completed high school show negative differential effects in comparison to participants with 
tertiary or some college education. These differences are monotonic with respect to 
education level. In particular, the magnitude of these differential effects is striking for those 
at the bottom of the schooling ladder and for two outcomes of interest: employment and 
monthly earnings. The TOT point estimates at six and twelve months after the intervention 
show the likelihood of employment is 74 percentage points lower for individuals with the 
least amount of formal schooling in comparison to those at the upper end of the schooling 
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distribution. For monthly earnings, the sizable negative magnitude of the coefficients holds 
over time. 			
Effect by Field of Training 
Knowing whether mean effects vary according to field of study could be important 
for policy because it may signal the importance of providing training participants with 
training in certain fields rather than in others. Table 5 provides intent-to-treat point 
estimates according to field of study. Rather than consider only one treatment indicator, we 
included multiple treatment variables in Equation 1 according to field of study. Each of 
these treatment indicators takes the value of 1 if it refers to the specific “X” field of study 
and is 0 otherwise. We considered the following categories: mechanical/machinery, 
hairdressing and beauty services, craftsmanship, agriculture and gardening, cooking and 
baking, and other services, which together accounted for 90 percent of training courses. 
These point estimates should be taken as merely indicative and assessed with caution, 
however, because sorting or self-selection of trainees into specific fields of study may be 
driven by unobserved factors (e.g., personal traits) which are, in turn, correlated with the 
outcomes of interest in Equation 1. 
Our results indicate impact heterogeneity for the Mongolian VTP according to 
chosen field of study in the short run, although most of the parameters lack statistical 
significance. “Mechanical/machinery” and “hairdressing and beauty services” show positive 
and significant effects, with the latter showing the largest effects across all outcomes of 
interest six months after the intervention. Consistently, the p-values of the F-test for the 
equality of parameters of interest across all fields of study are lower than 0.10 for three out 
of four outcomes of interest in the short run. These heterogeneous differences by field of 
study tend to dissipate across all fields of study at twelve months following treatment, 
however. Still, we observe that “hairdressing and beauty services” is the only field of study 
that shows positive and significant mean gains for the self-employment outcome twelve 
months after the intervention, while “agriculture and gardening” and “craftsmanship” show 
negative differential effects for earnings and self-employment outcomes. 
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All in all, there is some weak but suggestive evidence that indicates impact 
heterogeneity according to chosen field of study. These differences are observed mainly in 
the short run for particular fields of study and dissipated one year after treatment. 			
Newsletter Treatment 
Participants who attended training courses received repetitive weekly newsletters 
with information about wage returns to vocational training. The newsletters were randomly 
allocated at the class level in order to minimize treatment contamination among peers. Out 
of the 410 trainees who attended 141 training courses, 291 were assigned to the newsletter 
treatment group (101 courses) and 119 to the information control group (40 courses). Not 
all 291 individuals received the newsletters because some of them did not show up in the 
training centers. However, we focus on the estimation of ITT treatment effects without any 
formal distinction between ITT and TOT parameters because the rate of no-shows was 
relatively low for the information treatment. We asses five different outcomes of interest: 
days attended VTP, whether completed VTP, whether received VTP qualification (passed 
the exam), whether received VTP certificate (formal graduation from program), and dropout 
rates. Because there was variation in the length of the courses, we assess the impact of the 
newsletter treatment at the extensive (whether participants received the newsletter) and 
intensive (number of newsletters participants received) margins. 
The upper panel of Table 6 shows the results at the extensive margin. All variables 
show the expected signs although none of them is measured with statistical precision. In 
terms of magnitude of effects, some variables such as “received VTP qualification” (16 
percentage points) and “received VTP vocational qualification” show sizable effects, 
although they lack statistical significance. At the intensive margin, however, the lower panel 
shows statistically significant effects for all outcomes of interest. On average, each 
additional newsletter   is associated with 2.3 additional days of attendance, a higher 
probability of completing the course (6.9 percentage points), a higher probability of passing 
the qualification exam (8.5 percentage points), a higher probability of receiving a formal 
graduation certificate (5 percentage points), and a lower probability of dropping out (-7.7 
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percentage points). These results suggest that repetition of the message matters, a finding 
that is in line with the relatively recent stream of literature in development economics that 
provides analysis and insight regarding RCT interventions that use repetitive SMS messages 
to improve economic outcomes (e.g., health practices) in developing settings (e.g., Chong, 
2011).  
Unlike the impact of vocational training, which was of benefit to relatively better-off 
young participants, the newsletter-related intervention show no statistical differences in 
average gains across demographic groups. Table 7 illustrates the extensive (Panel A) and 
intensive (Panel B) margins at which we observe no statistically significant heterogeneous 
effects by age, gender, level of schooling, or poverty status. 
A related policy question is whether the combination of vocational training with the 
distribution of targeted information about market returns to training leads to higher wages 
and employment. To test this idea, we add an interaction term between the VTP treatment 
status in Equation 1 with the newsletter treatment. Table 8 shows the point estimates for 
the interaction terms along with standard errors. We do not observe statistically meaningful 
results because the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms are imprecisely 
measured across all outcomes of interest at six and twelve months after the intervention. 
Thus, although the newsletter treatment is effective in extending the length of exposure to 
the vocational skills training program (at the intensive margin), this does not translate into 
an improvement in the labor market outcomes of those who received the information vs. 
those who did not. 				
VII. Conclusion 
This study analyses the effectiveness of a demand-driven vocational training 
program in Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia. The setting of this study is new to the 
literature because little is known about Mongolia’s labor markets in light of its relatively 
recent transition from a centrally planned economy, wherein unemployment was set to zero 
by law, to a market economy. Like other demand-driven vocational training programs 
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implemented since the 1990s, the Mongolian VTP aimed to counteract high levels of youth 
unemployment by responding to actual labor market needs through a mix of traditional 
classroom courses and on-the-job training (internships).  
 Our evaluation framework followed a randomized-control-trial approach that 
identified average treatment effects under weak conditions. We implemented two 
independent random allocation developments: the first measured the labor market effects 
of vocational training vs. no training at all, and the second measured the role of information 
about market returns to training on the length of exposure to training. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first labor-market RCT implemented in central Asia. 
One striking result that emerged from this study was the low take-up rate for the 
intervention. Around 42% of individuals randomly assigned to training did not attend the 
courses. Analysis of the determinants of take-up showed that institutional constraints, 
notably the requirement that quadrilateral contracts be signed prior to the start of the 
course, as well as chosen field of study and some demographic variables (gender, 
education) played an important role in take-up. In particular, the quadrilateral-contract 
requirement, which is at the core of demand-driven approaches, seemed to be the major 
barrier to participation in training programs, and its role cannot be understated. 
Overall, we observed positive average effects of the training intervention on 
monthly earnings, skills matching, and self-employment. Positive results were mainly 
observed in the short run, however, though statistically significant effects on monthly 
earnings and self-employment persisted at twelve months. As in the case of other ALMPs 
implemented worldwide, we also observed that not everyone benefited equally from the 
program, which highlights the importance of policies that concern the targeting of 
participants and the design of training content. In fact, substantial heterogeneous effects 
emerged because relatively better-off, older, and better-educated students benefitted 
disproportionately from the intervention. Such results indicate that the Mongolian VTP 
failed to help those most in need. On the other hand, and unlike most demand-driven 
training programs, particularly those implemented in Latin America, the Mongolian did not 
benefit young women more than it did young men. This result held at six and months after 
the intervention. 
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Because length of exposure to training is related to the overall efficiency of the 
intervention, we randomly assigned students to receive weekly newsletters that contained 
information on market returns to vocational training in order to evaluate the impact of that 
information on variables related to the successful completion of training. In line with a new 
stream of literature on digital technologies (SMS messages) and economic outcomes in 
developing settings, which highlight the role of framing and message repetition, we found 
that providing information to young participants had positive impacts on the length of 
exposure to training and on the successful completion of training at the intensive margin. 
These positive results did not, however, lead to higher earnings or employment rates. 
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Appendices 
Figure 1: Mongolia 
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Figure 2: Timeline of the VT Intervention
Mongolian VT, 2014-2016 
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Socio-Demographics Treated Control p-value Treated w/ Letter Treated w/o Letter p-value
gender (1=males) 0.35 0.35 0.99 0.38 0.21 0.53
age 22.97 22.94 0.76 23.43 23.46 0.73
marital status (1=married) 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.49 0.51 0.99
residence (1=Ger) 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.47
less than high school 0.19 0.20 0.78 0.13 0.15 0.58
high school 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.23
technical education 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.32
college + 0.21 0.19 0.67 0.22 0.24 0.76
household size 3.99 4.09 0.25 3.96 3.98 0.20
has children 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.44 0.45 0.33
live with parents 0.48 0.46 0.81 0.47 0.43 0.86
parents have work 0.29 0.27 0.63 0.30 0.26 0.93
has disability 0.05 0.05 0.98 0.06 0.05 0.74
poverty index -0.00 0.01 0.87 0.18 0.21 0.80
Labor Market and Income
has work experience 0.61 0.62 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.25
# weeks of work experience 4.88 4.58 0.69 4.03 0.00 0.17
previous vocational training 0.20 0.22 0.50 0.23 0.27 0.09
out of LF (child care duties) 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.32 0.78
out of LF (student) 0.10 0.09 0.54 0.06 0.10 0.19
out of LF (homemaker) 0.06 0.07 0.44 0.04 0.05 0.79
no monthly income 0.54 0.55 0.90 0.49 0.48 0.86
has income from remittances 0.06 0.06 0.79 0.06 0.09 0.94
has labor market income 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.87
receive welfare income 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.18 0.21 0.56
Expectations
subjective prob of getting a job 0.78 0.80 0.28 0.77 0.80 0.31
optimistic to get a job 0.67 0.70 0.46 0.71 0.75 0.85
ambition to succeed in labor market 0.88 0.91 0.22 0.91 0.95 0.31
personal responsibility to get  a job 0.66 0.66 0.94 0.62 0.69 0.02
government responsibility to provide a job 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.88 0.90 0.94
plan to complete VT 0.94 0.96 0.45 0.94 0.95 0.39
number of days plan to attend VT 34 35 0.19 34 34 0.93
Elegibility 
eligible to VT due to unemployment status 0.85 0.84 0.58 0.83 0.88 0.10
employment as main reason to join VT 0.78 0.81 0.21 0.77 0.79 0.77
applied to cooking/baking VT courses 0.12 0.12 0.96 0.13 0.08 0.00
applied to beauty/hairdressing VT courses 0.23 0.26 0.57 0.25 0.26 0.45
applied to mechanical/machinery VT courses 0.26 0.23 0.31 0.28 0.11 0.11
applied to craftmanship  VT courses 0.17 0.13 0.31 0.20 0.18 0.03
applied to agriculture/gardening VT courses 0.02 0.01 0.41 0.02 0.00 0.00
Note: p-values from OLS models of treatment status on each baseline covariate of interest.  For Treatment I, we included a set of fixed-effects  for 
day of random assignment. For Treatment II, we included training center fixed effects. Sample size varies across covariates and ranges from 1185 to 1118 
for Treatment I and from 410 to 389 for Treatment II.
Treatment II: Information LettersTreatment I: Vocational Training (VT)
Table 1: Balancing Test Across Experimental Groups  
Mongolian VT, 2014-2016 
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coeff. std. error p-value
Socio-Demographics
age 20-24 -0.095* 0.049 0.057
age 25-30 -0.022 0.058 0.698
gender (1=males) -0.096* 0.051 0.058
marital status (1=married) 0.020 0.050 0.680
residence (1=Ger) -0.052 0.046 0.258
less than high school -0.124** 0.058 0.034
high school 0.028 0.044 0.525
technical education 0.013 0.070 0.848
household size   -0.017 0.012 0.154
has children 0.033 0.051 0.518
live with parents 0.060 0.054 0.268
parents have work 0.016 0.049 0.745
has disability 0.091 0.084 0.278
poverty index 0.031* 0.016 0.058
Labor Market and Income
has work experience 0.051 0.039 0.187
# weeks of work experience -0.000 0.000 0.118
previous vocational training 0.016 0.041 0.702
out of LF (child care duties) -0.043 0.050 0.386
out of LF (student) 0.015 0.060 0.803
out of LF (homemaker) -0.033 0.073 0.655
no monthly income -0.016 0.057 0.774
has income from remittances 0.056 0.086 0.509
has labor market income 0.059 0.067 0.381
has welfare income 0.097 0.072 0.181
Expectations
subjective prob of getting a job -0.058** 0.022 0.008
optimistic to get a job 0.158*** 0.048 0.001
ambition to succeed in labor market 0.037 0.055 0.499
personal responsibility to get  a job -0.038** 0.017 0.029
government responsibility to provide a job 0.067*** 0.017 0.000
plan to complete VT -0.016 0.077 0.831
number of days plan to attend VT 0.001 0.001 0.413
VT Institutions
trilateral VT contracts 0.545*** 0.049 0.000
ratio training slots/applicants  -0.000 0.001 0.870
eligible to VT due to unemployment status 0.022 0.048 0.639
Table 2: Determinants of Take-up  for Vocational Training Program 
Mongolian VT, 2014-2016 
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…..continuation
coeff. std. error p-value
know about VT through medios 0.126** 0.052 0.017
know about VT through letter -0.068 0.052 0.190
know about VT through Internet 0.083 0.071 0.244
know about VT through local employment office 0.063 0.041 0.132
applied to cooking VT courses -0.033 0.076 0.666
applied to beauty/hairdressing VT courses -0.202*** 0.073 0.006
applied to mechanical/machinery VT courses 0.184*** 0.074 0.014
applied to craftmanship  VT courses -0.199*** 0.075 0.009
applied to agriculture/gardening VT courses -0.038 0.076 0.710
N 702
R2 0.32
0.000
p-value of F-test for joint labor market variables=0 0.237
p-value of F-test for joint subjective expectations variables=0 0.000
p-value of F-test for joint VT institutions variables=0 0.000
Notes: Linear probabilistic model on take-up for VT program. Dependent variable takes the value 1 
for those treated units who attended program , 0 for the treated no-show units.
p-value of F-test for joint demographic variables=0
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Employment Monthly earnings Skills Match Self-Employment
ITT 0.055 56113 0.060 0.035
(0.035) (31335) (0.029)** (0.020)*
[0.046] [29978]* [0.031]* [0.019]*
R 2 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.16
TOT 0.128 130798 0.141 0.083
(0.077)* (69668)* (0.065)** (0.045)*
[0.099] [64699]** [0.069]** [0.043]*
R 2 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15
mean control group 0.456 234397 0.212 0.072
N 1044 1044 1044 1044
Employment Monthly Earnings Skills Match Self-Employment
ITT 0.011 62447 0.036 0.039
(0.035) (31887)** (0.031) (0.021)*
[0.038] [34200]* [0.038] [0.017]**
R 2 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.15
TOT 0.027 145244 0.085 0.092
(0.077) (70774)** (0.070) (0.047)**
[0.084] [76334]* [0.087] [0.039]**
R 2 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.14
mean control group 0.556 310000 0.254 0.071
N 975 975 975 975
Notes:Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered standard errors by date of random assignment in brackets. 
Intent-to-treat (ITT) parameters estimated by multivariate OLS models that use as control variables: gender, age, 
scholing, poverty index, district and place of residence (Ger), marital status, subjective job expectations related to  
likelihood of getting a job, ambition to succeed in labor markets, self-reliance to get a job, government responsibility 
to provide a job, and fixed-effects by date of random assignment. Tretment on the Treated (TOT) parameters 
estimated by 2SLS that instruments the treatment (T) by the randomly assigned treatment status (Z) of participants. 
Medium-term impacts: 12 months later
Short-term Impacts: 6 months later
Table 3:  Average Impacts on Labor-Market  Outcomes, Mongolian VT Training Program
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ITT TOT ITT TOT ITT TOT ITT TOT
VT Program 0.054 0.127 54518 128885* 0.051 0.121 0.018 0.046
(0.056) (0.121) (34954) (77709) (0.043) (0.093) (0.024) (0.052)
VT *Males 0.002 0.001  4598 5172 0.027 0.052 0.049 0.100
(0.073) (0.141) (66492) (133094) (0.070) (0.139) (0.055) (0.110)
VT Program 0.104** 0.214**  68682*  152084** 0.092** 0.197** 0.046* 0.197**
(0.052) (0.107) (35467) (71571) (0.040) (0.082) (0.024) (0.082)
VT * age 15 -21 -0.140** -0.266** -35618  -65668 -0.091* -0.172* -0.029 -0.172*
(0.062) (0.114) (41667) (76576) (0.049) (0.091) (0.031) (0.091)
VT Program 0.094** 0.210** 60939* 138528** 0.085*** -0.192*** 0.054** 0.121**
(0.045) (0.094) (32238) (69893) (0.032) (0.072) (0.023) (0.048)
VT *poor -0.147* -0.375*  -16691 -31850 -0.092* -0.230* -0.067* -0.169*
().084) (0.211) (56420) (143213) (0.053) (0.140) (0.039) (0.095)
VT Program 0.194** 0.371**  120131** 236334** 0.122** 0.242** 0.048 0.100
(0.079) (0.157) (56608) (112403) (0.066) (0.120) (0.040) (0.074)
VT * less high school -0.255** -0.540** -160794* -352399*  -0.184* -0.425* -0.039 -0.066
(0.105) (0.266) (86494) (211118) (0.099) (0.237) (0.066) (0.159)
VT * high school -0.168** -0.300** -58691 -97297 -0.045 -0.068 -0.009 -0.014
(0.084) (0.160) (59114) (111371) (0.083) (0.151) (0.049) (0.090)
R 2 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15
N 1044 1044 1044 1044 1044 1044 1044 1044
Notes:Clustered standard errors by date of random assignment in brackets. Intent-to-treat (ITT) parameters estimated by multivariate OLS models that include
as control variables: gender, age, scholing, houshehold assets index, districts, place of residence (Ger), marital status, and subjective expectation related to
 likelihood of getting a job, ambition to succeed in labor markets, self-reliance to get a job, government responsibility to provide a job, and date of random assignment.
of participants.  Poor is defined as 1 for those in the bottom quantile of the household wealth assets index. This index is estimated by PCA and includes indicators for 
 whether unit lives in a slum (Ger), unit has car, motocycle, computer at home, washing machine, vaccum cleaner, TV and refrigerator. 'Optimistic' is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for those who at baseline answered they felt optimistic to find a job in the next six months, 0 otherwise.  The base category for schooling is 
technical or university higher  education.   
Table 4A:  Heterogenous Impacts for VT Training Program, 6 months
Mongolia Vocational Training, 2014-2016
fixed effects. Treatment on the Treated  (TOT) parameters estimated by 2SLS that instruments the treatment indicator (T)  by the randomly assigned treatment status (Z) 
self-employment 6-monthsemployment 6-month wages  6-month skills match 6-month
	
	
	
	 28 
ITT TOT ITT TOT ITT TOT ITT TOT
VT Program 0.003 0.009 37816  90873 0.013 0.033 0.027 0.066
(0.045) (0.097) (31409) (68817) (0.044) (0.095) (0.020) (0.044)
VT *Males 0.023 0.049 72334 151347 0.069 0.144 0.033 0.070
(0.063) (0.012) (64194) (127318) (0.086) (0.170) (0.050) (0.098)
VT Program 0.033 0.065 87083**  186595** 0.039 0.088 0.039 0.088
(0.045) (0.095) (42285) (86869) (0.043) (0.093) (0.043) (0.093)
VT * age 15 -21 -0.062  -0.119 -70079*  -130343* -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009
(0.055) (0.100) (40511) (68525) (0.044) (0.080) (0.044) (0.080)
VT Program 0.034 0.073  88872**  197889** 0.065 0.144 0.065*** 0.145***
(0.045) (0.098) (39253) (85734) (0.042) (0.095) (0.024) (0.048)
VT *poor -0.082 -0.210 -97829*  -242598* -0.106 -0.267 -0.097* -0.245*
(0.077) (0.185) (53283) (128834) (0.070) (0.171) (0.057) (0.132)
VT Program 0.161** 0.287* 134847**  258922** 0.065 0.128 0.079** 0.154***
(0.080) (0.152) (55701) (106855) (0.073) (0.136) (0.031) (0.059)
VT * less high school  -0.307*** -0.746**  -230586*** -562700*** -0.084 -0.185 -0.118** -0.273*
(0.114) (0.296) (80503) (201676) (0.097) (0.236) (0.058) (0.152)
VT * high school -0.171** -0.296*  -49874 -71908 -0.017 -0.025 -0.034 -0.052
(0.092) (0.168) (83061) (153073) (0.079) (0.141) (0.077) (0.080)
R 2 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14
N 975 975 975 975 975 975 975 975
Notes:Clustered standard errors by date of random assignment in brackets. Intent-to-treat (ITT) parameters estimated by multivariate OLS models that include
as control variables: gender, age, scholing, houshehold assets index, districts, place of residence (Ger), marital status, and subjective expectation related to
 likelihood of getting a job, ambition to succeed in labor markets, self-reliance to get a job, government responsibility to provide a job, and date of random assignment.
of participants.  Poor is defined as 1 for those in the bottom quantile of the household wealth assets index. This index is estimated by PCA and includes indicators for 
 whether unit lives in a slum (Ger), unit has car, motocycle, computer at home, washing machine, vaccum cleaner, TV and refrigerator. 'Optimistic' is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for those who at baseline answered they felt optimistic to find a job in the next six months, 0 otherwise.  The base category for schooling is 
technical or university higher  education.   
Table 4B: Heterogenous Impacts for VT Training Program, 12 months 
Mongolia Vocational Training, 2014-2016
self-employment 6-months
fixed effects. Treatment on the Treated  (TOT) parameters estimated by 2SLS that instruments the treatment indicator (T)  by the randomly assigned treatment status (Z) 
employment 12-month wages  12-month skills match 12-month
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employment earnings skills match self-employment employment earnings skills match self-employment
       Mechanical/Machinery   (β1) 0.129** -21703 0.094 0.012 -0.004  48819 -0.023 -0.003
(0.062) (68031) (0.073) (0.041) (0.056) (78553) (0.057) (0.043)
       Hairdressing/Beauty career (β2) 0.236*** 129943** 0.128** 0.080* 0.014  63719 -0.023 0.100***
(0.078) (50981) (0.062) (0.048) (0.064) (55939) (0.079) (0.036)
       Craftmanship (β3) 0.013 97720 -0.044 -0.045 -0.064 -111548*** -0.083 -0.072
(0.072) (110417) (0.079) (0.052) (0.066) (38514) (0.077) (0.052)
       Agriculture /Gardening (β4) -0.009  38960 0.113 -0.009 -0.110 -194734*** -0.114 -0.074**
(0.093) (61186) (0.071) (0.049) (0.082) (53043) (0.091) (0.035)
       Cooking/Baking  (β5) -0.034 -37804 0.011 -0.003 -0.016 17718 0.073 0.027
(0.075) (45130) (0.065) (0.044) (0.089) (62730) (0.093) (0.054)
       Services (β6) 0.082 9790 0.053 -0.049 -0.081 -96279 0.064 0.021
(0.118) (60613) (0.116) (0.055) (0.092) (52410) (0.082) (0.055)
p-value: F-test : β1=β2=β3=β4=β5=β6 0.044 0.096 0.062 0.343 0.724 0.039 0.525 0.003
p-value: F-test : β1=β2 0.231 0.052 0.638 0.278 0.822 0.857 0.991 0.092
p-value: F-test : β1=β3 0.174 0.448 0.073 0.313 0.399 0.069 0.398 0.278
p-value: F-test : β1=β4 0.148 0.525 0.810 0.753 0.274 0.022 0.388 0.223
p-value: F-test : β1=β5 0.096 0.836 0.260 0.807 0.910 0.725 0.358 0.596
p-value: F-test : β1=β6 0.686 0.734 0.748 0.373 0.473 0.157 0.376 0.733
p-value: F-test : β2=β3 0.014 0.793 0.005 0.044 0.373 0.010 0.532 0.002
p-value: F-test : β2=β4 0.012 0.217 0.829 0.138 0.197 0.001 0.374 0.002
p-value: F-test : β2=β6 0.007 0.005 0.103 0.159 0.783 0.509 0.456 0.221
p-value: F-test : β2=β5 0.202 0.114 0.557 0.052 0.417 0.061 0.437 0.200
N 1044 1044 1044 1044 975 975 975 975
R2 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.16
Notes: Clustered standard errors by date of random assignment in parenthesis. Average impacts estimated by a multivariate OLS regression model that include as control variables
gender, age, scholing, household wealth assets index, district and place of residence (Ger), marital status, subjective expectations related to likelihood of getting a job, ambition to
succeed in labor markets, self-reliance to get a job, government responsibility to provide a job, and date of random assignment fixed effects. The main independent variables are
dummy variables by field of study that take the value 1 if unit chose the corresponding field, 0 otherwise.  
Table 5: Intent-to-Treat  Impacts by Field of Study, Mongolian VT Program 
6 months after treatment 12 months after treatment
	
	
	 30 
Days attended VT Complete VT Got VT Qualification Got VT Certificate Dropout (adm. variable)
Panel A:Extensive Margin
     treated letters 3.028 0.062 0.163 0.001 -0.012
(3.357) (0.095) (0.169) (0.077) (0.032)
     N 360 359 359 360 382
     R 2 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.29
Panel B:Intensive Margin
    number letters received 2.341** 0.068** 0.085** 0.050* -0.077**
(1.132) (0.031) (0.043) (0.026) (0.034)
     N 360 359 359 360 381
     R 2 0.23 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.39
Notes: ITT parameters  estimated by multivariate OLS models that include training center fixed effects. Control variables include gender, age, schooling,  
household assets index, district and place of residence (Ger), marital status, unemployed status, whether has VT trilateral, contract, subjective expectations on 
likelihood of getting a job, ambition to succeed in labor market, government responsibility to provide jobs. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by the 
training center in which participants enrolled. All outcome variables are self-reported with the exception of 'dropouts'.
Table 6: Intent-to-treat impacts of information letters intervention on intermediate outcomes
Mongolia Vocational Training, 2014-2016
	
	
	 31 
Panel A: Extensive Margin
     treated letters 2.898 0.031 0.198 -0.001 -0.015
(3.069) (0.110) (0.197) (0.095) (0.043)
     treated letters* males 0.479 0.111 -0.131 -0.001 0.011
(8.483) (0.219) (0.164) (0.117) (0.102)
     treated letters 1.341 0.015 0.187 -0.059 -0.006
(3.643) (0.103) (0.203) (0.089) (0.042)
     treated letters*age 15-21 4.512 0.132 -0.067 0.170 -0.012
(4.191) (0.106) (0176) (0.155) (0.074)
     treated letters 2.246 0.030 0.17 0.017 0.011
(3.152) (0.099) (0.173) (0.072) (0.036)
     treated letters* poor 3.593 0.132 -0.047 0.084 -0.113
(4.943) (0.179) (0.163) (0.113) (0.071)
     treated letters 4.309 0.092 0.272 0.075 0.017
(5.205) (0.176) (0.216) (0.167) (0.036)
     treated letters*less high school 4.639 0.199 0.010 0.052 -0.039
(6.497) (0.169) (0.187) (0.194) (0.102)
     treated letters* high school -3.936 -0.125 -0.222 -0.168 -0.041
(5.233) (0.191) (0.184) (0.195) (0.054)
     N 360 359 359 360 382
     R 2 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.29
Table 7: Information letters ITT Impacts on intermediate outcomes: Heterogeneous Impacts
Mongolia Vocational Training, 2014-2016
Days attended 
VT training
Completed  
VT training
Got VT 
Qualification
Got VT 
Certificate
Dropout 
(adm. variable)
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continuation…….
Panel B:Intensive Margin
    number letters received 1.984** 0.044* 0.091* 0.048* -0.061*
(0.093) (0.025) (0.054) (0.028) (0.031)
     number letters received * males 1.302 0.087 -0.023 0.006 -0.059
(2.238) (0.066) (0.058) (0.039) (0.037)
     treated letters 2.026* 0.062* 0.099** 0.041 -0.082**
(1.211) (0.035) (0.045) (0.029) (0.039)
     treated letters* age1521 0.848 0.021 -0.047 0.031 0.018
(1.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.025)
     treated letters 2.330* 0.063** 0.081** 0.048** -0.078**
(1.210) (0.031) (0.041) (0.027) (0.036)
     treated letters* poor -0.218 0.019 0.021 0.004 0.006
(1.569) (0.043) (0.039) (0.028) (0.023)
     treated letters 1.945 0.063 0.104* 0.067 -0.051
(1.503) (0.053) (0.054) (0.049) (0.035)
     treated letters*less high school 0.497 0.001 -0.047 -0.040 -0.017
( 1.703) (0.049) (0.052) (0.041) (0.026)
     treated letters high school 0.543 0.005 -0.025 -0.022 -0.045
(1.626) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051) (0.022)
     N 360 359 359 360 381
     R 2 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.39
Notes: Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered by the training center to which participants belong. ITT parameters estimated by multivariate 
 marital status, unemployed status, whether unit has VT trilateral contract, subjective expectations on likelihood of getting a job, ambition to
succeed in labor market, self-reliance to get a job, government responsibility to provide a job. Estimation sample covers only individuals assigned
to the treatment group and who attended the VT courses. 
 'Poor' is defined as 1 for those in the bottom quantile of the household wealth assets index. This asset index is estimated by PCA and includes
indicators for  whether unit lives in a slum (Ger), unit has car, motocycle, computer at home, washing machine, vaccum cleaner, TV and refrigerator. 
The base category for schooling is technical or university higher  education.    
OLS models that include training center fixed effects, gender, age, schooling, household wealth assets index, district and place of residence (Ger),
Days attended 
VT training
Completed  
VT training
Got VT 
Qualification
Got VT 
Certificate
Dropout 
(adm. variable)
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6-month 12-month 6-month 12-month 6-month 12-month
VT Program 0.051 0.029 70631** 76710** 0.054* 0.054
(0.047) (0.040) (34266) (34203) (0.033) (0.037)
VT *Letters 0.010 -0.053 -44806 -44305 0.018 -0.053
(0.049) (0.054) (31300) (43731) (0.053) (0.043)
VT Program 0.050 0.012 66050**  59813** 0.052* 0.037
(0.046) (0.039) (32594) (31765) (0.030) (0.038)
VT * number of letters  0.007 -0.002 -15248 4087 0.012 -0.000
(0.018) (0.018) (10442) (17185) (0.018) (0.014)
R 2 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.16
N 1044 975 1044 975 1044 975
Notes:Clustered standard errors by date of random assignment in brackets. Intent-to-treat (ITT) parameters estimated by multivariate 
OLS models that include as control variables: gender, age, scholing, houshehold assets index, districts, place of residence (Ger),
marital status, and subjective expectation related to likelihood of getting a job, ambition to succeed in labor markets, self-reliance
 to get a job, government responsibility to provide a job, and date of random assignment.fixed effects. "Letters" is define as 1 for those 
who are randomly assigned to the treatment information group, 0 otherwise. All control units are inputted the value 0 for both  
"letters" and "number of letters". 
Table 8:  Differential (ITT) Impacts of  VT Training by Information Letters Status
Mongolia Vocational Training, 2014-2016
employment labor income skills match
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Appendix Table 1A: Sample of Information Letter submitted to trainees	
Mongolian VT Program, 2014-2016 
 
 
 
Dear Mrs. XXX 
 
According to official statistics in our country, people who complete vocational training 
courses show substantial improvement in their labor-market outcomes.  Think about 
these numbers:  
 
• In 2012, people with vocational and professional skills made 35% more in salaries 
than people without those skills: the average monthly salary of individuals with 
vocational and professional skills was 464000 MNT, while the average monthly 
earnings of individuals without any professional or/and vocational skills was only 
342900 MNT.  
 
• In 2012, people with vocational and professional skills took the majority of 
available jobs: two out of three individuals with vocational and professional skills 
were employed, while only half of people without vocational and professional 
skills were employed. 
 
These numbers suggest that completing your vocational training course might be a 
good investment.  The benefits of vocational training could last for many years to come.  
 
Would you like to improve the chances of being successful in the labor markets?  Do you 
want to get a job?  
You could achieve these goals by completing this vocational training course!  
 
Your success is in your hands! 
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attrition rate
Target  sample 1188 ----
Reach  course assignment stage 1140 4.1%
Answer baseline survey questionnaire 1124 5.4%
Answer first follow-up survey 1075 9.6%
Answer second follow-up survey 1003 15%
Source: Administrative data from VT program
Appendix Table 2A: Attrition Rates   
Mongolian VT, 2014-2016 
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Socio-Demographics Observed Missing p-value Observed Missing p-value
gender (1=males) 0.33 0.44 0.11 0.32 0.47 0.00
age 22.96 22.24 0.16 22.99 22.36 0.07
marital status (1=married) 0.46 0.30 0.18 0.48 0.27 0.00
residence (1=Ger) 0.83 0.64 0.01 0.84 0.72 0.00
less than high school 0.20 0.20 0.94 0.19 0.24 0.23
high school 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.37
technical education 0.08 0.08 0.95 0.09 0.06 0.36
college + 0.20 0.16 0.52 0.20 0.14 0.09
household size 4.05 3.54 0.02 4.03 4.00 0.84
has children 0.44 0.28 0.01 0.45 0.31 0.00
live with parents 0.48 0.60 0.12 0.48 0.61 0.00
parents have work 0.29 0.44 0.02 0.28 0.42 0.00
has disability 0.04 0.04 0.80 0.04 0.04 0.90
poverty index -0.01 0.12 0.37 0.01 0.01 0.82
Labor Market and Income
has work experience 0.62 0.50 0.09 0.62 0.52 0.04
# weeks of work experience 5.03 0.00 0.31 5.31 0.57 0.16
previous vocational training 0.20 0.26 0.35 0.21 0.14 0.05
out of LF (child care duties) 0.27 0.12 0.01 0.28 0.16 0.00
out of LF (student) 0.09 0.12 0.55 0.09 0.12 0.26
out of LF (homemaker) 0.06 0.04 0.46 0.06 0.05 0.73
no monthly income 0.54 0.60 0.42 0.53 0.63 0.03
has income from remittances 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.72
has labor market income 0.14 0.12 0.63 0.14 0.11 0.36
receive welfare income 0.15 0.12 0.49 0.15 0.12 0.33
Expectations
subjective prob of getting a job 78.23 79.68 0.68 78.39 77.44 0.68
optimistic to get a job 0.68 0.70 0.78 0.68 0.69 0.71
ambition to succeed in labor market 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.98
personal responsibility to get  a job 66.71 63.87 0.48 66.74 65.22 0.56
government responsibility to provide a job 85.48 92.34 0.02 85.20 90.72 0.00
plan to complete VT 0.94 0.90 0.13 0.95 0.90 0.04
number of days plan to attend VT 34.54 31.63 0.15 34.61 32.72 0.17
Elegibility 
eligible to VT due to unemployment status 0.84 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.71
employment as main reason to join VT 0.79 0.68 0.05 0.80 0.68 0.00
applied to cooking/baking VT courses 0.12 0.06 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.79
applied to beauty/hairdressing VT courses 0.24 0.36 0.06 0.24 0.27 0.46
applied to mechanical/machinery VT courses 0.25 0.24 0.87 0.24 0.25 0.98
applied to craftmanship  VT courses 0.15 0.24 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.08
applied to agriculture/gardening VT courses 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.07
N 1069 50 996 121
Notes: sample means by attrition status in first and second follow-up survey data. p-values from standard t-test  of equality of means.
Appendix Table 3A: Balancing Test by Attrition Status   
Mongolian VT, 2014-2016 
1st follow-up attrition 2nd follow-up attrition
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VT Treated group VT Control  group Total
Random allocation to 1st treatment: VT training 766 374 1140
Enroll to VT training courses 439 27 466
Do not enroll to VT training treatment 327 --- ----
answer baseline survey and take treatment 420
answer fisrt follow-up survey and take treatment 399
answer second follow-up survey and take treatment 373
VT Treated with Letter VT Treated w/o Letter Total 
Random allocation to 2nd treatment: "letters" 291 119 410
Take "letters" treatment 256 ---- 256
Do not take "letters" treatment 35 ---- 35
answer baseline survey and take treatment 253 ----
answer fisrt follow-up survey and take treatment 241 ----
answer second follow-up survey and take treatment 224 ----
Source: Administrative data from VT program
Appendix Table 4A: Mongolian VT Take Up 
Mongolian VT, 2014-2016 
	
	
	
6-months 12-months
Randomization (Instrument) 0.419*** 0.427***
(0.026) (0.027)
constant  -0.271 -0.293
(0.466) (0.488)
N 1044 975
R2 0.35 0.36
F-statistic of first stage regression 24.73 23.72
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. First stage regresion uses the same
control covariates as the second stage regression. Covariates are describe
 in footnote of Table 1.  
Appendix Table 5A: First Stage of 2SLS Model 
	
	
	
	
